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C.O.S. (60)224

17TH AUGUST, 1960

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting\* on Tuesday, 16th August, 1960, the Chiefs of Staff approved the report at annex which examines whether, from the military point of view, West German participation in Berlin Contingency Planning is desirable.

2. In approving the report the Chiefs of Staff invited the Ministry of Defence to forward it to the Foreign Office as an expression of their views.

(Signed) J.D. WARNE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W. 1.

17TH AUGUST, 1960.

\* C.O.S.(60)51st Meeting, Minute 4

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have recently expressed<sup>+</sup> disquiet at their exclusion from Berlin Contingency Planning and have made<sup>+</sup> formal representation that there should be full German participation in this planning. We also understand<sup>+</sup> that a request may be expected shortly from General Norstad for the assignment of a German officer to the LIVE OAK group to act as an observer, having access to all planning papers but not injecting his Government's views. The Foreign Office have asked whether German participation is militarily desirable and acceptable from the security point of view.

AIM

2. To examine whether, from the military point of view, German participation in Berlin Contingency Planning is desirable.

PRESIDENT STATE OF MILITARY PLANNING

3. Since the United Kingdom approved<sup>+</sup> the relevant LIVE OAK planning papers, detailed tripartite plans have been prepared, though entirely without commitment, for the operations<sup>+</sup> listed below:-

(a) Operation to Restore Autobahn Access to Berlin

This plan (TRI-DE WIND) has been prepared by C-in-C BAOR, the field commander designate.

(b) Tripartite Plans for Berlin Airlift and Air Access Contingencies

This plan (J.CK PINE) has been prepared by C-in-C UKFE who would be responsible for the overall control of all air operations.

General Norstad has approved these plans and forwarded them to the three Ministries of Defence with a request for the preparation of national supporting plans.

4. A detailed plan<sup>+</sup> has also been prepared (FREE STYLE) for the assembly of the force to undertake the initial probe of Soviet intentions.

5. Detailed planning for proposed countermeasures<sup>+</sup>, which are political and psychological rather than military, has not yet been implemented.

IMPLICATIONS OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY PLANNING

6. The Tripartite Powers have a special responsibility for Berlin which is not shared by the Federal Government, although

+ Telegram Bonn to Foreign Office, No. 614 of 15 Jul 60  
+ Telegram Foreign Office to Paris, No. 1424 of 22 Jul 60

UKNMR 304

+ COS.1205/23/9/59, D(50)6th Mtg., Item 2

Ø COS(60)153, COS(60)169

Ø COS(60)167

£ COS(59)199

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CONCLUSIONS

11. We conclude that from the military and security points of view:-

- (a) Full German participation in Berlin military Contingency Planning is not justified. There is, however, a need for the Federal authorities to be informed in advance of certain detailed support requirements for the proposed air operations.
- (b) We are not convinced that the Federal Government need be kept more fully informed than hitherto of progress in military planning. If, however, this were done, it must be recognised that the feasibility of the plans, which is already rather doubtful on military grounds, would be further jeopardized by security risks and by the introduction of potentially conflicting political considerations.